By Suresh Unnithan
Democracy does not collapse overnight. It erodes when one political formation acquires so much power that checks, balances and the possibility of genuine alternation begin to wither. India’s recent history offers successive illustrations of this danger: the prolonged single-party dominance of the 1970s, the sweeping parliamentary majority of the 1980s, and the sustained concentration of authority under the present dispensation. In each case the formal institutions of democracy remained intact, yet the substance of democratic accountability suffered. The Constitution, however, was never designed to leave the system defenceless.
The mid-1970s remain the starkest warning. After a decisive electoral victory, the ruling party treated the state apparatus as an extension of its will. Civil liberties were suspended, opposition leaders jailed, the press censored and the bureaucracy used to enforce loyalty. Yet the Constitution itself provided the tools that eventually forced a correction. The 44th Amendment later restored key safeguards by making the proclamation of Emergency subject to stricter parliamentary approval and by protecting the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 from suspension. The basic structure doctrine, affirmed in Kesavananda Bharati, declared that judicial review, free and fair elections, and the separation of powers cannot be destroyed even by constitutional amendment. When the system reopened, voters delivered a decisive rejection—proof that the Constitution’s residual capacity for self-correction still functioned.
A similar pattern appeared in the mid-1980s. An enormous mandate produced technological optimism and administrative energy, yet the same concentration of power generated serious excesses. Scandals involving defence deals, attempts to undermine independent institutions, and the opportunistic use of religion in sensitive personal-law and religious-site disputes all reflected a governing culture that treated parliamentary majorities as licences rather than temporary trusts. Here again the Constitution’s architecture—independent judiciary under Articles 124–147, the Election Commission’s autonomy under Article 324, and the federal division of powers—acted as residual restraints, even when imperfectly enforced.
The pattern has reappeared under the present prolonged single-party dominance at the Centre. Successive national mandates have given the ruling formation control of the Union government, most state governments and, increasingly, the institutional architecture that is supposed to constrain executive power. Large parliamentary majorities are not inherently undemocratic, but when they are accompanied by progressive pressure on referees—investigative agencies, regulatory bodies, universities and sections of the media—the system begins to test the Constitution’s limits. The safeguards remain clear: the basic structure doctrine still protects judicial independence and free elections; Article 19 continues to guarantee freedom of speech and expression; the federal structure and the post-Bommai restrictions on Article 356 limit the Centre’s ability to arbitrarily dismiss state governments; and the Comptroller and Auditor General, the Election Commission and an independent judiciary remain constitutionally insulated from pure executive control.
The common thread across these periods is not ideology but structure. When one party accumulates excessive power, accountability weakens, decision-making narrows, and public trust in institutions erodes. The Indian Constitution anticipates this danger. It embeds multiple layers of protection—fundamental rights enforceable through Article 32, separation of powers, federalism, judicial review, and the basic structure doctrine—precisely to prevent temporary majorities from becoming permanent dominance. These safeguards are not self-executing. They require vigilance from citizens, courts, the press and opposition parties. Without determined defence of these constitutional firewalls, democracy risks becoming a ritual rather than a living system of self-correction.