By Advocate Salini T S
In a landmark ruling that underscores the judiciary’s role as the ultimate guardian of constitutional checks and balances, the Supreme Court of India on November 19, 2025, declared key provisions of the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021, unconstitutional. Delivered by a bench comprising Chief Justice B.R. Gavai and Justice K. Vinod Chandran, the judgment not only invalidates the government’s bid to streamline tribunal operations but also directs the establishment of an independent National Tribunals Commission to oversee appointments and administration. This decision represents a significant setback for the Narendra Modi-led government, which has pursued aggressive reforms to consolidate executive influence over quasi-judicial bodies handling everything from tax disputes to environmental clearances. As India grapples with mounting judicial backlogs and policy disputes, the verdict reignites debates on the fragile equilibrium between Parliament’s legislative ambitions and the Constitution’s foundational principles.
The Judgment: A Constitutional Reckoning
At its core, the 56-page judgment dismantles the 2021 Act’s framework for tribunal governance, labeling it a “repackaged” iteration of a previously quashed ordinance that failed to address judicially identified flaws. The Act, enacted amid parliamentary disruptions with minimal debate, sought to impose uniform service conditions—such as a four-year tenure cap, fixed salaries, and executive-dominated selection committees—across 20-odd tribunals, including the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) and the National Green Tribunal (NGT). It also abolished nine specialized tribunals, reallocating their functions to overburdened High Courts and commercial courts, ostensibly to rationalize the system but effectively diluting specialized adjudication.
Chief Justice Gavai, authoring the opinion, minced no words in critiquing the legislation’s assault on judicial independence. “When Parliament designs or alters the tribunal system, it must do so in a manner consistent with the constitutional requirements of independence, impartiality, and effective adjudication,” he wrote, invoking Articles 14 (equality), 323A, and 323B of the Constitution, alongside the doctrine of separation of powers. The bench rejected the government’s contention—advanced by Attorney General R. Venkataramani—that Parliament could override Supreme Court directives through fresh legislation. Instead, it reaffirmed judicial review as a “basic structure” of the Constitution, quoting Dr. B.R. Ambedkar: “If the executive is honest in working the Constitution, it must act in accordance with the judicial decisions given by the Supreme Court.”
Justice Chandran’s concurrence added a poetic sting, dismissing the Act as “old wine in a new bottle, the wine whets not the judicial palate, but the bottle merely dazzles.” The court highlighted how the Act replicated defects from the Tribunals Reforms Ordinance, 2021—struck down in Madras Bar Association v. Union of India (2021)—without substantive fixes, such as ensuring a judiciary-majority in selection committees or protecting tenures from arbitrary curtailment. In a pragmatic move, the bench protected ongoing appointments, reverting tribunal members’ terms to their parent statutes (e.g., five-year tenures for ITAT members) and shielding pre-Act selections from disruption.
The directive to form a National Tribunals Commission within four months stands out as a forward-looking reform. Envisioned as an “essential structural safeguard,” this body would standardize appointments, budgets, and infrastructure while insulating tribunals from executive whims—echoing recommendations from prior judgments like Rojer Mathew v. South Indian Bank (2019).
Historical Context: Tribunals as Battleground for Power
Tribunals in India, introduced under the 42nd Constitutional Amendment in 1976, were meant to expedite dispute resolution in specialized domains, easing the Supreme Court’s docket. Over decades, however, they evolved into flashpoints for executive-judicial friction. The Modi government, since 2014, has aggressively restructured them—merging 19 tribunals in 2017, dissolving others via ordinances—to align with its “ease of doing business” mantra and centralize oversight. Critics, including petitioners like the Madras Bar Association and Congress MP Jairam Ramesh, argued these moves masked a deeper agenda: subordinating tribunals to the Union executive, given the Centre’s stake as a frequent litigant in tax, telecom, and environmental matters.
The 2021 Act was the latest salvo in this saga. Enacted just months after the Supreme Court invalidated a similar ordinance, it was challenged as a “sly revival” that flouted Madras Bar Association v. Union of India (2020 and 2021), which mandated balanced selection committees and secure tenures to prevent “hire and fire” dynamics. The bench’s exasperation was palpable: over three decades, the Union has “repeatedly failed to adhere to court directions,” turning tribunals into perennial litigation fodder rather than efficient adjuncts to justice.
Analytical Impact: A Setback to Modi’s Governance Model
For the Modi government, this judgment is more than a legal rebuff—it’s a political and administrative hurdle in its quest for streamlined, executive-friendly institutions. The BJP’s reforms, often justified as efficiency drives, have consistently clashed with judicial scrutiny, from the 2019 abrogation of Article 370 to farm laws struck down in 2021. Here, the Act’s emphasis on uniform, shorter tenures and executive-led panels was seen as enabling patronage and quick replacements, potentially tilting outcomes in favor of government positions in high-stakes cases like GST disputes or climate litigation.
The ruling disrupts this centralization push at a precarious juncture. With Lok Sabha elections looming in 2029 and coalition dynamics straining post-2024, the government faces accusations of overreach from opposition quarters. Jairam Ramesh hailed it as a “victory for constitutionalism,” amplifying narratives of an “undeclared emergency” under Modi. Administratively, the four-month deadline for the National Tribunals Commission could strain resources, forcing the Law Ministry to legislate anew amid bureaucratic inertia. Failure to comply risks contempt proceedings, further eroding the executive’s credibility.
Broader implications ripple through India’s federal fabric. Tribunals handle inter-state and Centre-state disputes; executive dominance could exacerbate tensions in a diverse nation. The verdict bolsters judicial morale, signaling that “respect for settled law is as essential to good governance as it is to judicial discipline.” Yet, it also burdens courts: reallocating abolished tribunals’ workloads to High Courts may worsen pendency, which already exceeds 50 million cases nationwide.
Politically incorrect as it may sound, the Modi era’s hallmark—decisive, top-down reforms—has thrived on ordinances and post-facto legislations, often bypassing deliberation. This judgment exposes the limits of such bravado: Parliament’s sovereignty is not absolute, and repeated judicial overrides risk portraying the government as constitutionally defiant, alienating moderate allies and urban elites who value rule of law.
Looking Ahead: Toward Collaborative Reform?
The Supreme Court’s directive offers a blueprint for redemption. A robust National Tribunals Commission could foster transparency—perhaps via digitized selections and fixed budgets—while preserving tribunal specialization. For the Modi government, embracing this could recast it as a reformer responsive to judicial wisdom, mending fences ahead of key 2026 state polls.
Ultimately, this verdict is a clarion call for tripartite harmony. As Chief Justice Gavai reminded, reducing pendency demands “shared responsibility,” not adversarial posturing. In an era of polarized politics, it reaffirms that India’s Constitution endures not through dominance, but dialogue—ensuring tribunals serve justice, not agendas. The ball is now in the government’s court; how it plays could define its legacy on institutional integrity.
The author is a lawyer of the High Court of Kerala. She can be contacted at adv.salinimavoor@gmail.com