By Rakesh Dubey, Bhopal
One must ask: why has the American President, Donald Trump, abruptly turned so courteous and conciliatory toward India? He has begun to speak of the country in the most flattering terms and has repeatedly expressed confidence that a trade agreement with New Delhi is all but inevitable. Trump has insisted, time and again, that the deal is in its final stages.
As his emissary, he dispatched Secretary of State and National Security Advisor Marco Rubio to India. During his three-day sojourn, Rubio described India as a “refining superpower.” He held meetings not only with Reliance Chairman Mukesh Ambani but also with Adani Group Chairman Gautam Adani and Tata Sons Chairman N. Chandrasekaran—clear evidence of commercial diplomacy at work. Rubio even travelled to Reliance’s Jamnagar refinery, fully aware that only this facility possesses the capacity to process Venezuela’s high-sulphur, heavy, and inferior-grade crude.
In refining capability, India ranks as the world’s fourth most proficient nation, after the United States, China, and Russia. Its twenty-three refineries, led by Jamnagar, now account for more than 21 per cent of global refining capacity. The United States and Europe have become major purchasers of Indian petroleum products—diesel, petrol, and aviation fuel. This new dimension of India’s economic influence became especially visible when Rubio conveyed President Trump’s desire to forge an India–America alliance in the oil sector. While India is already a strategic partner of the United States, it can also meet a significant portion of its energy requirements through American supplies. Washington, it appears, is now eager to place the bilateral relationship on a fresh footing—one that offers greater depth, dimension, and durability.
Trump has, for the time being, consigned the legislation that would have imposed 100 per cent tariffs on India to cold storage, not least because the United States itself continues to import diesel from Russia. In the evolving circumstances, India purchased roughly 128,000 barrels of American crude per day between January and September, but was compelled to reduce this volume to about 91,000 barrels in October. American oil arrives only after considerable delay and, owing to higher transportation costs, proves more expensive. India already imports more than eight billion dollars’ worth of oil from the United States.
Meanwhile, New Delhi has continued its purchases from Russia while substantially reducing its dependence on the Gulf states—a shift that may well be explained by the Iran conflict and the consequent disruption of maritime routes. Venezuela remains the world’s largest producer and exporter of oil, and it is now under American control. Rubio has therefore proposed that India source the bulk of its oil from the United States rather than from Russia. Washington has, at least for the moment, abandoned the language of sanctions. It wishes Venezuela’s heavy crude to be refined at the Reliance facility. The Ambani and Adani groups are also playing an increasingly prominent role in the data sector. In this altered landscape, the United States has begun to appear unexpectedly deferential and is actively discussing an energy partnership with India.
There was a time when America regarded India merely as a minor “ant” of markets and industry, and considered even the act of engagement a form of condescension. The equations of the world and of commerce have since changed. India now occupies the stature of a great power within the global order. What we are witnessing is the dawn of a new era, a new arrangement, and a new kind of diplomatic relationship with an emerging “superpower.”
Trump himself stands at the lowest ebb of his political fortunes and popularity. Barely 31 per cent of Americans support him, while some 68 per cent oppose his economic policies—among them 37 per cent of Republican voters. He is therefore under pressure to demonstrate tangible results. The United States faces an acute shortage of petroleum products; diesel and petrol prices are reported to have reached unexpectedly elevated levels. Nearly 265 billion dollars have already been expended on the Iran conflict. Trump finds himself in a defensive posture, anxious to restore his standing. In this context, India can offer assistance, for even Washington has come to recognise the sophistication of its refining capacity.
The most consequential question, however, remains: can India afford to repose decisive trust in Trump? His record of conduct makes such confidence difficult to sustain. One day he declares that the war with Iran is about to end; the next, he promises a decisive strike. One day he assures India that higher taxes will not be imposed; the next, he reiterates the threat of 100 per cent tariffs. Such volatility of temperament inspires little faith.
