From IFIMES
In July 2024, Belarus became the first European country to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). This was followed in January 2025 by the signing of three strategic partnership agreements within the Eurasian region. Such developments can be regarded as part of the broader historical transformations currently reshaping the world. These partnerships are set to have a pivotal impact on geopolitical and geoeconomic positioning, signalling a shift in the geographical centres of confrontation and cooperation towards new regions, away from the traditional power hubs of the previous century. As a result, 2025 is set to be a year of profound transformation across the world stage.
Belarus – the first European country to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
At the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit held in July 2024 in Astana, the capital of Kazakhstan, Belarus was admitted as the organisation’s tenth full member. Prior to this, Belarus had held observer status since 2015, alongside Mongolia and Afghanistan[2].
Established in 2001 by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, the SCO is an intergovernmental cooperation mechanism aimed at strengthening collaboration in areas such as security, counter-terrorism, economy, and energy. In the years that followed, India, Pakistan, and Iran joined as full members. Today, 14 other countries participate in the organisation as dialogue partners: Azerbaijan, Armenia, Cambodia, Nepal, Turkey, Sri Lanka, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, the Maldives, Myanmar, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait.
Belarus’s accession has further reinforced the organisation’s Eurasian dimension. For Minsk, joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation represents a significant step, signalling a change in its official foreign policy towards the East. This shift was initiated by President Alexander Lukashenko four years ago, after it became apparent that the country’s previous multilateral approach—balancing relations with the West, Russia, and “faraway countries” (particularly China)—was proving ineffective. Instead of ensuring security or economic prosperity, this strategy left Belarus increasingly vulnerable to external pressures and threats, placing it in a kind of self-imposed isolation from major international powers, without clearly aligning with any side.
Belarus has made participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) a priority, focusing on expanding economic cooperation and reducing dependence on the US dollar as the global reserve currency. In his address at the summit, President Lukashenko underscored this point, stating: “Belarus considers it a priority to establish a bilateral payment mechanism in national currencies, as well as a collective financial institution for the SCO. We often talk about how powerful we are — and indeed we are. We account for over 40 per cent of the world’s population and around one-third of global GDP.”[3]
The Belarusian leader called for the adoption of a Eurasian Charter on Diversity and Multipolarity within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Belarus’s accession to the SCO once again highlights the divergence of the country’s political trajectory from that of its post-Soviet neighbours — namely the Baltic states and Ukraine — where efforts to integrate into Euro-Atlantic structures have been accompanied by a rise in Russophobia and deteriorating relations with Russia.
In the early 1990s, it seemed that Belarus might follow the same perilous path as the aforementioned countries. Why did this not happen? One key reason was that political Russophobia, rooted in ethnic nationalism, was not as deeply embedded in Belarusian society as it was in the Baltic states and Ukraine. This allowed Belarus to engage with both Western and Eastern partners in a calmer, more pragmatic manner, free from ideological constraints and stereotypes. Had this not been the case, Belarus might have faced the same fate as Ukraine, which lost a three-year war with Russia, suffering territorial losses and being left with a status that remains uncertain, as it is not expected to be welcomed into either NATO or the EU in the foreseeable future.
As early as the first decade of the 21st century, Belarus became an active participant in the Non-Aligned Movement while simultaneously strengthening its ties with China. Belarus may have been one of the first post-Soviet states to consider cooperation with this rising global power. As such, accession to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation represents a logical continuation of President Lukashenko’s visionary foreign policy.
Declaration on the One Hundred Year Partnership Agreement between the United Kingdom and Ukraine
Without any prior media attention, the signing of the One Hundred Year Partnership Agreement with Ukraine on 16 January 2025 caught the world off guard — a strategic move by the United Kingdom on both the European and global stage. The agreement was concluded during a surprise visit to Ukraine by British Prime Minister Keir Starmer.[4]
According to official statements, the agreement is intended to strengthen defence cooperation between the two countries. It grants the UK access to mineral extraction on Ukrainian soil. In return, Britain will expand its military training programme for Ukrainian personnel, deepen collaboration on long-range weapons, and invest in Ukraine’s defence industry — including drones, artillery, and technology transfer. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated that the agreement also contains a restricted and classified section. In addition, Ukraine is expected to receive 6.6 billion US dollars in military aid this year, along with more than three billion dollars annually as part of a long-term support commitment. The timing of the British move can be interpreted and analysed from several angles. It came just days before newly elected US President Donald Trump entered the White House and assumed office. As Trump’s campaign had centred on resolving the conflict in Ukraine through negotiations, the signing of the agreement dealt a painful blow to Britain’s traditional ally. In retaliation, Trump did not spare the United Kingdom, imposing a 10 per cent tariff on imported British goods. His intention to incorporate Canada as the 51st US state was seen as a direct affront to the United Kingdom, given that Canada remains under the British Crown.
By signing the agreement, the United Kingdom took a pre-emptive step to advance its strategic interests in Eastern Europe ahead of any ceasefire negotiations in Ukraine. This would enable it to use the interim period to exert pressure on Moscow and secure a long-term geopolitical, economic, and energy stake before the final lines of control and influence in Eastern Europe are drawn. On the other hand, Britain is leveraging this move to apply pressure on the new Trump administration, which appears to undervalue its allies and strives to expand its reach at their expense in an effort to establish a geopolitical and economic foothold in Eastern Europe. This is reflected in Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s remarks about the potential deployment of British peacekeeping forces to Ukraine. Such a step would likely cause discomfort in Washington, which is keen to see an end to the Russia-Ukraine conflict. This, in turn, raises concern in London, which has spent decades building its strategic posture on sustained hostility towards Moscow.
Partnership Agreement between the United States and Armenia
On 14 January 2025, two days before the signing of the One Hundred Year Partnership Agreement between the United Kingdom and Ukraine, another equally significant event took place in Washington: the United States and Armenia signed a strategic partnership agreement. This move also came as a tactical surprise in light of the rapidly evolving global realignments and new alliances. The agreement was signed by outgoing US Secretary of State Antony Blinken.[5]
The agreement sets out a solid framework encompassing a broad spectrum of areas, including strengthening economic and energy ties, expanding channels of communication, deepening cooperation in defence and security, reinforcing democratic institutions, promoting justice and the rule of law, and developing innovation and advanced technologies — all of which are essential for navigating an increasingly complex geopolitical landscape. Blinken placed particular emphasis on economic and energy issues, as well as Washington’s readiness to assist Armenia in the peaceful use of nuclear technology. Both sides highlighted the importance of the agreement for achieving stability in the South Caucasus.
There is little doubt that the US–Armenia strategic partnership agreement will have geopolitical and geoeconomic ramifications in the very heart of Eurasia and the Caucasus, where global competition is at its most intense. Competition in this region is particularly fierce due to the multitude of competing transport and energy projects, as well as key land and sea routes connecting East to West and North to South.
While Armenia now positions itself as a multi-aligned state, maintaining ties with both East and West — including the US, France, Russia, Iran, and India — this does little to change the reality of regional confusion that the new agreement is likely to provoke. Through this agreement, the United States appears to be sending a clear message to all other players: “We are now at the heart of Eurasia, on everyone’s borders. There will be neither war nor peace without Washington, and no energy project or corridor can escape our influence.” US Secretary of State Blinken, who welcomed Armenia’s involvement in the North–South corridor linking Iran with Russia and India, as well as in energy routes connecting Azerbaijan and the Black Sea to Turkey and Europe, may well have intended to signal to the EU and China that the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (B&R) cannot function without the United States.
Russia was the first to respond, with Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov cautioning that Armenia cannot simultaneously remain a member of the Eurasian Economic Union — to which it currently belongs — and pursue EU membership, as the two frameworks are fundamentally incompatible. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan and its ally Turkey, along with Iran, a traditional partner of Armenia, have voiced concern over Armenia’s new geopolitical orientation. This latest American move in the Eurasian region could serve as a unifying factor among countries long divided by rivalry: Iran, Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Russia.
In the context of ongoing global transformations — which have coincided with the inauguration of the new US administration under Donald Trump — it would be reasonable to examine the recent wave of accelerated developments: the expansion of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation to the borders of the European Union via Belarus’s accession; the UK–Ukraine agreement; the US–Armenia strategic partnership; the Russia–Iran agreement of 17 January 2025; and the China–Iran partnership agreement signed in 2021. All of these developments must be understood within the broader framework of global transformation and the ongoing struggle to shape a new multipolar world order. Numerous indicators point in this direction, most notably in President Trump’s first speech following his inauguration, in which he expressed a desire for peace, a commitment to preventing future wars, and a focus on rebuilding the United States from within.
