By Suresh Unnithan
In his February 24, 2026, State of the Union address, President Donald Trump delivered an extraordinary display of self-congratulation, claiming to have ended eight wars in his first ten months in office. He singled out the May 2025 India-Pakistan tensions, asserting that without his intervention the conflict would have escalated to nuclear war, killing “35 million people” and claiming the life of Pakistan’s prime minister. Trump repeatedly credited threats of 200% tariffs for forcing de-escalation, a narrative India has firmly and repeatedly rejected as baseless. Hours earlier in the same speech, and in immediate follow-up remarks, he made clear his intention to defy the US Supreme Court’s February 20 ruling that invalidated his signature “Liberation Day” tariffs. Labelling the 6-3 decision “terrible” and attacking the justices—including two he appointed—as lacking “courage” and being “fools,” Trump announced a fresh 10% across-the-board tariff under alternative authority and vowed to pursue every legal and legislative workaround. This combination of inflated foreign-policy boasting and open confrontation with the judiciary risks dragging the United States into a sustained economic and political crisis, with consequences that could weaken American institutions, erode global credibility, and inflict long-term damage on growth and alliances for years beyond his presidency.
The Supreme Court’s ruling was unambiguous. In Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, Chief Justice John Roberts, joined by Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Barrett and Jackson, held that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) does not grant the president authority to impose tariffs. The decision struck down the sweeping reciprocal and fentanyl-related duties imposed since April 2025, placing more than $160 billion in collected revenues in legal limbo and opening the door to refund claims. While other tariff authorities remain available, the Court’s clear limit on emergency powers removes the administration’s preferred blunt instrument for unilateral trade warfare.
Trump’s immediate pivot to a new 10% global tariff under Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974—initially set for 150 days—does not restore the old regime’s scope or permanence. It merely prolongs uncertainty. Markets, businesses and trading partners now face repeated rounds of litigation, congressional fights over extensions, and retaliatory measures. The economic costs are already evident: higher input prices for manufacturers, elevated consumer costs in electronics, autos, pharmaceuticals and apparel, and disrupted supply chains. Independent estimates had projected the original Liberation Day tariffs would reduce GDP growth and raise household expenses by hundreds of dollars annually; the new measures ensure those pressures continue.
For India, the president’s rhetoric adds insult to injury. By insisting in a formal address to Congress that tariff blackmail stopped a war India says it managed through direct bilateral channels and its own military operation (Sindoor), Trump has turned a Quad partner into a prop in his domestic narrative. Indian officials have consistently dismissed any US mediation role. The result is strained bilateral trust at a time when Washington needs New Delhi as a counterweight to China. Tentative trade understandings reached in early February now look fragile, threatening Indian exports of pharmaceuticals, gems, textiles and services while exposing US farmers and manufacturers to potential retaliation.
Politically, the timing is toxic. With November 2026 midterms less than nine months away, tariffs remain deeply unpopular—polling consistently shows disapproval above 60%, including among independents and Republican voters in swing districts already bruised by higher costs in 2018-19. Democrats now have a straightforward attack: even a conservative Supreme Court, including two Trump appointees, ruled the policy illegal. Republican lawmakers must choose between defending an overreach rejected by the judiciary or risking presidential fury. The Section 122 tariffs force Congress into a high-stakes vote on extension right before the midterms, guaranteeing messy floor fights and potential veto overrides that expose GOP divisions.
The longer-term fallout is more troubling. Repeated executive attempts to circumvent judicial limits risk normalising attacks on the courts, weakening the separation of powers that has defined American governance. Trading partners will treat US commitments as temporary and reversible, reducing Washington’s negotiating leverage and encouraging them to diversify away from American markets. Strategic relationships, especially with India, suffer when a partner is publicly belittled for domestic applause. Persistent policy volatility deters investment, slows growth and leaves the Federal Reserve managing inflation amid self-inflicted shocks.
Trump’s tariff aggression was always more spectacle than sustainable strategy. The Supreme Court has curtailed its most extreme form, yet the president’s response—boastful overreach abroad and institutional defiance at home—threatens to turn a policy setback into a broader national crisis. Nine months before voters deliver their verdict in the midterms, the United States stands at risk of prolonged economic pain, deepening political polarisation and diminished standing in the world. The consequences will not end with this administration; they could shape America’s economic trajectory and global role for a generation.
